Citation: J. Bendor et P. Swistak, EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIA - CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, Theory and decision, 45(2), 1998, pp. 99-159
Citation: L. Sapir, THE OPTIMALITY OF THE EXPERT AND MAJORITY RULES UNDER EXPONENTIALLY DISTRIBUTED COMPETENCE, Theory and decision, 45(1), 1998, pp. 19-35
Citation: Ha. Michener et Dj. Myers, AN EMPIRICAL-COMPARISON OF PROBABILISTIC COALITION STRUCTURE THEORIESIN 3-PERSON SIDEPAYMENT GAMES, Theory and decision, 45(1), 1998, pp. 37-82
Citation: Mh. Sonstegaard, A SHORTCUT METHOD OF CALCULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTION OUTCOMETYPES UNDER APPROVAL VOTING, Theory and decision, 44(3), 1998, pp. 211-220
Citation: Vmr. Tummala et H. Ling, A NOTE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE MEAN RANDOM CONSISTENCY INDEX OF THEANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP), Theory and decision, 44(3), 1998, pp. 221-230
Citation: G. Vanderlaan et R. Vandenbrink, AXIOMATIZATION OF A CLASS OF SHARE FUNCTIONS FOR N-PERSON GAMES, Theory and decision, 44(2), 1998, pp. 117-148
Citation: Ida. Macintyre, 2-PERSON AND MAJORITY CONTINUOUS AGGREGATION IN 2-GOOD SPACE IN SOCIAL CHOICE - A NOTE, Theory and decision, 44(2), 1998, pp. 199-209