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Results: 176-198/198
Authors:
TARADAS BANDY0PADHYAY
LARRY SAMUELS0N
Citation: TARADAS BANDY0PADHYAY et LARRY SAMUELS0N, Weakly Implementable Social Choice Rules, Theory and decision, 33(02), 1992, pp. 135
Authors:
GIAC0M0 B0NANN0
Citation: GIAC0M0 B0NANN0, Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games, Theory and decision, 33(02), 1992, pp. 153
Authors:
HANNU SAL0NEN
Citation: HANNU SAL0NEN, An Axiomatic Analysis of the Nash Equilibrium Concept, Theory and decision, 33(02), 1992, pp. 177
Authors:
PAUL J. H. SCHOEMAKER
Citation: PAUL J. H. SCHOEMAKER, Subjective Expected Utility Theory Revisited: A Reductio Ad Absurdum Paradox, Theory and decision, 33(01), 1992, pp. 1
Authors:
LOUIS EECKHOUDT
PIERRE HANSEN
Citation: LOUIS EECKHOUDT et PIERRE HANSEN, Mean-Preserving Changes in Risk with Tail-Dominance, Theory and decision, 33(01), 1992, pp. 23
Authors:
RONALD R. YAGER
Citation: RONALD R. YAGER, On Generalized Measures of Realization in Uncertain Environments, Theory and decision, 33(01), 1992, pp. 41
Authors:
DAVID KELSEY
Citation: DAVID KELSEY, Risk and Risk Aversion for State-Dependent Utility, Theory and decision, 33(01), 1992, pp. 71
Authors:
DAVID RIOS INSUA
Citation: DAVID RIOS INSUA, On the Foundations of Decision Making under Partial Information, Theory and decision, 33(01), 1992, pp. 83
Authors:
PHILIPPE VINCKE
Citation: PHILIPPE VINCKE, Exploitation of a Crisp Relation in a Ranking Problem, Theory and decision, 32(03), 1992, pp. 221
Authors:
RAMI ZWICK
AMNON RAPOPORT
JOHN C. HOWARD
Citation: RAMI ZWICK et al., Two-Person Sequential Bargaining Behavior with Exogenous Breakdown, Theory and decision, 32(03), 1992, pp. 241
Authors:
SVEN OVE HANSSON
Citation: SVEN OVE HANSSON, A Procedural Model of Voting, Theory and decision, 32(03), 1992, pp. 269
Authors:
MARLIES KLEMISCH-AHLERT
Citation: MARLIES KLEMISCH-AHLERT, Distributive Justice of Bargaining and Risk Sensitivity, Theory and decision, 32(03), 1992, pp. 303
Authors:
D. K. DESPOTIS
J. SISKOS
Citation: D. K. DESPOTIS et J. SISKOS, Agricultural Management Using the ADELAIS Multiobjective Linear Programming Software: A Case Application, Theory and decision, 32(02), 1992, pp. 113
Authors:
MARK IRVING LICHBACH
Citation: MARK IRVING LICHBACH, The Repeated Public Goods Game: A Solution Using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl Point, Theory and decision, 32(02), 1992, pp. 133
Authors:
ERIC RASMUSEN
Citation: ERIC RASMUSEN, Folk Theorems for the Observable Implications of Repeated Games, Theory and decision, 32(02), 1992, pp. 147
Authors:
RAIMO TUOMELA
Citation: RAIMO TUOMELA, On the Structural Aspects of Collective Action and Free-Riding, Theory and decision, 32(02), 1992, pp. 165
Authors:
GEORGE G. SZPIRO
Citation: GEORGE G. SZPIRO, Insurance Buying Gamblers, Theory and decision, 32(02), 1992, pp. 203
Authors:
OLE HAGEN
Citation: OLE HAGEN, Survival through the Allais Paradox, Theory and decision, 32(02), 1992, pp. 209
Authors:
ARIEL DINAR
AHARON RATNER
DAN YARON
Citation: ARIEL DINAR et al., Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in Water Resources, Theory and decision, 32(01), 1992, pp. 1
Authors:
HECTOR A. MUNERA
Citation: HECTOR A. MUNERA, A Deterministic Event Tree Approach to Uncertainty, Randomness and Probability in Individual Chance Processes, Theory and decision, 32(01), 1992, pp. 21
Authors:
JOSEPH B. KADANE
Citation: JOSEPH B. KADANE, Healthy Scepticism as an Expected-Utility Explanation of the Phenomena of Allais and Ellsberg, Theory and decision, 32(01), 1992, pp. 57
Authors:
M. A. J. J. VAN GASTEL
J. H. P. PAELINCK
Citation: M. A. J. J. VAN GASTEL et J. H. P. PAELINCK, Generalization of Solution Concepts in Conflict and Negotiation Analysis, Theory and decision, 32(01), 1992, pp. 65
Authors:
MICHELE BERNASCONI
GRAHAM LOOMES
Citation: MICHELE BERNASCONI et GRAHAM LOOMES, Failures of the Reduction Principle in an Ellsberg-Type Problem, Theory and decision, 32(01), 1992, pp. 77