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Results: 101-118/118
Authors:
LAFONTAINE F
Citation: F. Lafontaine, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS AS SIGNALING DEVICES - EVIDENCE FROM FRANCHISING, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 256-289
Authors:
HENNART JF
ANDERSON E
Citation: Jf. Hennart et E. Anderson, COUNTERTRADE AND THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS - AN EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 290-313
Authors:
DAUGHETY AF
REINGANUM JF
Citation: Af. Daughety et Jf. Reinganum, ENDOGENOUS SEQUENCING IN MODELS OF SETTLEMENT AND LITIGATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 314-348
Authors:
DANA JD
SPIER KE
Citation: Jd. Dana et Ke. Spier, EXPERTISE AND CONTINGENT FEES - THE ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION INATTORNEY COMPENSATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 349-367
Authors:
KAHAN M
Citation: M. Kahan, SALES OF CORPORATE-CONTROL, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 368-379
Authors:
LYON TP
HACKETT SC
Citation: Tp. Lyon et Sc. Hackett, BOTTLENECKS AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES - OPEN ACCESS AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTING IN NATURAL-GAS, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 380-398
Authors:
CHE YK
YI JG
Citation: Yk. Che et Jg. Yi, THE ROLE OF PRECEDENTS IN REPEATED LITIGATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 399-424
Authors:
HERTZEL MG
SMITH JK
Citation: Mg. Hertzel et Jk. Smith, INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF INTERFIRM LAWSUITS - EVIDENCE FROM PENNZOIL V TEXACO, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(2), 1993, pp. 425-444
Authors:
BESANKO D
SPULBER DF
Citation: D. Besanko et Df. Spulber, CONTESTED MERGERS AND EQUILIBRIUM ANTITRUST POLICY, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 1-29
Authors:
ZIV A
Citation: A. Ziv, PERFORMANCE-MEASURES AND OPTIMAL ORGANIZATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 30-50
Authors:
RABIN M
Citation: M. Rabin, INFORMATION AND THE CONTROL OF PRODUCTIVE ASSETS, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 51-76
Authors:
KATZ A
Citation: A. Katz, TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE LEGAL MECHANICS OF EXCHANGE - WHEN SHOULD SILENCE IN THE FACE OF AN OFFER BE CONSTRUED AS ACCEPTANCE, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 77-97
Authors:
BARNETT WP
CARROLL GR
Citation: Wp. Barnett et Gr. Carroll, HOW INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AFFECTED THE ORGANIZATION OF EARLY UNITED-STATES TELEPHONY, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 98-126
Authors:
HERMALIN BE
Citation: Be. Hermalin, MANAGERIAL PREFERENCES CONCERNING RISKY PROJECTS, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 127-135
Authors:
OLSEN TE
TORSVIK G
Citation: Te. Olsen et G. Torsvik, THE RATCHET EFFECT IN COMMON AGENCY - IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION ANDPRIVATIZATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 136-158
Authors:
GREENSTEIN S
Citation: S. Greenstein, PROCEDURAL RULES AND PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS - COMPLEXITY CREATES TRADE-OFFS, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 159-180
Authors:
WOLF HC
Citation: Hc. Wolf, ENDOGENOUS LEGAL BOOMS, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 181-187
Authors:
TAYLOR CR
Citation: Cr. Taylor, DELIVERY-CONTINGENT CONTRACTS FOR RESEARCH, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 188-203