Citation: Dw. Harless et Sp. Peterson, INVESTOR BEHAVIOR AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POORLY-PERFORMING MUTUAL FUNDS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 257-276
Citation: S. Grant et A. Kajii, AUSI EXPECTED UTILITY - AN ANTICIPATED UTILITY-THEORY OF RELATIVE DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 277-290
Citation: A. Chaudhuri, THE RATCHET PRINCIPLE IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAME WITH UNKNOWN COSTS - AN EXPERIMENTAL-ANALYSIS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 291-304
Citation: Prp. Coelho et Je. Mcclure, SOCIAL-CONTEXT AND THE UTILITY OF WEALTH - ADDRESSING THE MARKOWITZ CHALLENGE, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 305-314
Citation: Ge. Bolton et E. Katok, AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE CROWDING OUT HYPOTHESIS - THE NATURE OF BENEFICENT BEHAVIOR, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 315-331
Citation: E. Amir et Y. Ganzach, OVERREACTION AND UNDERREACTION IN ANALYSTS FORECASTS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 333-347
Citation: F. Andersson et Hj. Holm, TRANSPARENCY PREFERENCE AND ECONOMIC-BEHAVIOR, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 349-356
Citation: Lf. Ackert et Bk. Church, INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH - EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 357-371
Citation: Sj. Solnick et D. Hemenway, IS MORE ALWAYS BETTER - A SURVEY ON POSITIONAL CONCERNS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(3), 1998, pp. 373-383
Citation: Cd. Phelps, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARENTALDIVORCE, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 151-168
Citation: Gm. Anderson et Rd. Tollison, CELESTIAL MARRIAGE AND EARTHLY RENTS - INTERESTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF POLYGAMY, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 169-181
Citation: Cb. Cadsby et E. Maynes, CHOOSING BETWEEN A SOCIALLY EFFICIENT AND FREE-RIDING EQUILIBRIUM - NURSES VERSUS ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS STUDENTS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 183-192
Citation: Ja. List et Jf. Shogren, CALIBRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL VALUATIONS IN A FIELD EXPERIMENT, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 193-205
Citation: H. Osano, MORAL HAZARD AND RENEGOTIATION IN MULTIAGENT INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WHENEACH AGENT MAKES A RENEGOTIATION OFFER, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 207-230
Citation: Sk. Berninghaus et Km. Ehrhart, TIME HORIZON AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN TACIT COORDINATION GAMES - EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 231-248
Citation: Wh. Sulis, CHAOS, CATASTROPHE, AND HUMAN AFFAIRS - APPLICATIONS OF NONLINEAR DYNAMICS IN WORK, ORGANIZATIONS, AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION - GUASTELLO,S, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(2), 1998, pp. 249-252
Citation: Do. Stahl, IS STEP-J THINKING AN ARBITRARY MODELING RESTRICTION OR A FACT OF HUMAN-NATURE, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(1), 1998, pp. 33-51
Citation: M. Alexeev et M. Kaganovich, RETURNS TO HUMAN-CAPITAL UNDER UNCERTAIN REFORM - GOOD GUYS FINISH LAST, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(1), 1998, pp. 53-70
Citation: E. Amann et Cl. Yang, SOPHISTICATION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF COOPERATION, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 37(1), 1998, pp. 91-105