Citation: P. Sudholter, AXIOMATIZATIONS OF GAME THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS FOR ONE-OUTPUT COST-SHARING PROBLEMS, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 142-171
Citation: E. Vandamme et R. Aumann, ON THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN GAME-THEORY - AN INTERVIEW WITH AUMANN,ROBERT, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 181-210
Citation: K. Chatterjee et B. Dutta, RUBINSTEIN AUCTIONS - ON COMPETITION FOR BARGAINING PARTNERS, Games and economic behavior, 23(2), 1998, pp. 119-145
Citation: I. Erev et A. Rapoport, COORDINATION, MAGIC, AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN A MARKET ENTRY GAME, Games and economic behavior, 23(2), 1998, pp. 146-175
Citation: Bj. Ruffle, MORE IS BETTER, BUT FAIR IS FAIR - TIPPING IN DICTATOR AND ULTIMATUM GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 23(2), 1998, pp. 247-265
Citation: Dg. Pearce et E. Stacchetti, THE INTERACTION OF IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT CONTRACTS IN REPEATED AGENCY, Games and economic behavior, 23(1), 1998, pp. 75-96
Citation: K. Chatterjee et Cc. Lee, BARGAINING AND SEARCH WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT OUTSIDE OPTIONS, Games and economic behavior, 22(2), 1998, pp. 203-237