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Results: 51-75/628
Authors:
Wellman, MP
Walsh, WE
Wurman, PR
MacKie-Mason, JK
Citation: Mp. Wellman et al., Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling, GAME ECON B, 35(1-2), 2001, pp. 271-303
Authors:
Wurman, PR
Wellman, MP
Walsh, WE
Citation: Pr. Wurman et al., A parametrization of the auction design space, GAME ECON B, 35(1-2), 2001, pp. 304-338
Authors:
Vulkan, N
Citation: N. Vulkan, Equilibria in automated interactions, GAME ECON B, 35(1-2), 2001, pp. 339-348
Authors:
Anderson, SP
Goerce, JK
Holt, CA
Citation: Sp. Anderson et al., Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 177-199
Authors:
Binmore, K
Samuelson, L
Citation: K. Binmore et L. Samuelson, Evolution and mixed strategies, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 200-226
Authors:
Biswas, AK
Parthasarathy, T
Ravindran, G
Citation: Ak. Biswas et al., Stability and largeness of the core, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 227-237
Authors:
Costa-Gomes, M
Zauner, KG
Citation: M. Costa-gomes et Kg. Zauner, Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 238-269
Authors:
De Sinopoli, F
Citation: F. De Sinopoli, On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 270-286
Authors:
Einy, E
Shitovitz, B
Citation: E. Einy et B. Shitovitz, Private value allocations in large economies with differential information, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 287-311
Authors:
Robles, J
Citation: J. Robles, Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 312-330
Authors:
Watts, A
Citation: A. Watts, A dynamic model of network formation, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 331-341
Authors:
Wooders, J
Shachat, JM
Citation: J. Wooders et Jm. Shachat, On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games, GAME ECON B, 34(2), 2001, pp. 342-363
Authors:
Bossert, W
Peters, H
Citation: W. Bossert et H. Peters, Minimax regret and efficient bargaining under uncertainty, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 1-10
Authors:
Cox, JC
Shachat, J
Walker, M
Citation: Jc. Cox et al., An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 11-33
Authors:
Jacobsen, HJ
Jensen, M
Sloth, B
Citation: Hj. Jacobsen et al., Evolutionary learning in signalling games, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 34-63
Authors:
Klaus, B
Citation: B. Klaus, Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferencesand the assignment of an indivisible object, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 64-82
Authors:
Ma, JP
Citation: Jp. Ma, Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 83-103
Authors:
Sarin, R
Vahid, F
Citation: R. Sarin et F. Vahid, Predicting how people play games: A simple dynamic model of choice, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 104-122
Authors:
Schwalbe, U
Walker, P
Citation: U. Schwalbe et P. Walker, Zermelo and the early history of game theory, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 123-137
Authors:
Selten, R
Wooders, MH
Citation: R. Selten et Mh. Wooders, Cyclic games: An introduction and some examples, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 138-152
Authors:
Slikker, M
van den Nouweland, A
Citation: M. Slikker et A. Van Den Nouweland, A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division, GAME ECON B, 34(1), 2001, pp. 153-175
Authors:
Baliga, S
Evans, R
Citation: S. Baliga et R. Evans, Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments, GAME ECON B, 33(2), 2000, pp. 159-176
Authors:
Charness, G
Citation: G. Charness, Self-serving cheap talk: A test of Aumann's conjecture, GAME ECON B, 33(2), 2000, pp. 177-194
Authors:
Che, YK
Citation: Yk. Che, Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999), GAME ECON B, 33(2), 2000, pp. 195-205
Authors:
Chung, KS
Citation: Ks. Chung, On the existence of stable roommate matchings, GAME ECON B, 33(2), 2000, pp. 206-230