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Results: 1-13 |
Results: 13
SOCIAL-LEARNING IN RECURRING GAMES (VOL 21, PG 102, 1997)
Authors: JACKSON MO KALAI E
Citation: Mo. Jackson et E. Kalai, SOCIAL-LEARNING IN RECURRING GAMES (VOL 21, PG 102, 1997), Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 145-145
EFFICIENCY AND VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION IN MARKETS WITH REPEATED PAIRWISE BARGAINING
Authors: JACKSON MO PALFREY TR
Citation: Mo. Jackson et Tr. Palfrey, EFFICIENCY AND VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION IN MARKETS WITH REPEATED PAIRWISE BARGAINING, Econometrica, 66(6), 1998, pp. 1353-1388
SOCIAL-LEARNING IN RECURRING GAMES
Authors: JACKSON MO KALAI EK
Citation: Mo. Jackson et Ek. Kalai, SOCIAL-LEARNING IN RECURRING GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 21(1-2), 1997, pp. 102-134
STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOTMENT RULES
Authors: BARBERA S JACKSON MO NEME A
Citation: S. Barbera et al., STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOTMENT RULES, Games and economic behavior, 18(1), 1997, pp. 1-21
APPROXIMATELY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE FINITE ECONOMIES
Authors: JACKSON MO MANELLI AM
Citation: Mo. Jackson et Am. Manelli, APPROXIMATELY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE FINITE ECONOMIES, Journal of economic theory, 77(2), 1997, pp. 354-376
A CHARACTERIZATION OF GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTIONS WHICH LEAD TO IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS
Authors: JACKSON MO SRIVASTAVA S
Citation: Mo. Jackson et S. Srivastava, A CHARACTERIZATION OF GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTIONS WHICH LEAD TO IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS, Review of Economic Studies, 63(1), 1996, pp. 23-38
A STRATEGIC MODEL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS
Authors: JACKSON MO WOLINSKY A
Citation: Mo. Jackson et A. Wolinsky, A STRATEGIC MODEL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS, Journal of economic theory, 71(1), 1996, pp. 44-74
STRATEGY-PROOF EXCHANGE
Authors: BARBERA S JACKSON MO
Citation: S. Barbera et Mo. Jackson, STRATEGY-PROOF EXCHANGE, Econometrica, 63(1), 1995, pp. 51-87
UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN BOUNDED MECHANISMS
Authors: JACKSON MO PALFREY TR SRIVASTAVA S
Citation: Mo. Jackson et al., UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN BOUNDED MECHANISMS, Games and economic behavior, 6(3), 1994, pp. 474-501
ON THE RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES FOR 2 PERSON, FINITE GAMES
Authors: JACKSON MO SRIVASTAVA S
Citation: Mo. Jackson et S. Srivastava, ON THE RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES FOR 2 PERSON, FINITE GAMES, Economics letters, 45(3), 1994, pp. 315-318
A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA
Authors: JACKSON MO
Citation: Mo. Jackson, A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA, Journal of economic theory, 64(1), 1994, pp. 221-233
SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
Authors: JACKSON MO
Citation: Mo. Jackson, SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, Hitotsubashi journal of economics, 34, 1993, pp. 149-161
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS
Authors: JACKSON MO
Citation: Mo. Jackson, INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS, Economics letters, 40(3), 1992, pp. 299-302
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