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Results:
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Results: 5
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
Authors:
Keiding, H Peleg, B
Citation:
H. Keiding et B. Peleg, Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments, J MATH ECON, 36(2), 2001, pp. 117-140
Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
Authors:
Fristrup, P Keiding, H
Citation:
P. Fristrup et H. Keiding, Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus, SOC CHOICE, 18(2), 2001, pp. 213-226
Correlated equilibria of games with many players
Authors:
Keiding, H Peleg, B
Citation:
H. Keiding et B. Peleg, Correlated equilibria of games with many players, INT J GAME, 29(3), 2000, pp. 375-389
An axiomatic characterization of efficiency indices
Authors:
Christensen, F Hougaard, JL Keiding, H
Citation:
F. Christensen et al., An axiomatic characterization of efficiency indices, ECON LETT, 63(1), 1999, pp. 33-37
On the structure of the set of Nash equilibria of weakly nondegenerate bimatrix games
Authors:
Keiding, H
Citation:
H. Keiding, On the structure of the set of Nash equilibria of weakly nondegenerate bimatrix games, ANN OPER R, 84, 1998, pp. 231-238
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