Authors: GEHRLEIN WV LEPELLEY D

Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, THE CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF APPROVAL VOTING AND THE PROBABILITY OF ELECTING THE CONDORCET LOSER, Journal of mathematical economics, 29(3), 1998, pp. 271-283

Authors: LEPELLEY D MBIH B

Citation: D. Lepelley et B. Mbih, STRATEGIC MANIPULATION IN COMMITTEES USING THE PLURALITY RULE - ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS AND FREQUENCY CALCULATIONS, Group decision and negotiation, 6(2), 1997, pp. 119-138

Authors: GEHRLEIN WV LEPELLEY D

Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, CONDORCETS-PARADOX UNDER THE MAXIMAL CULTURE CONDITION, Economics letters, 55(1), 1997, pp. 85-89

Authors: LEPELLEY D

Citation: D. Lepelley, CONSTANT SCORING RULES, CONDORCET CRITERIA AND SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES, Economic theory, 7(3), 1996, pp. 491-500

Authors: LEPELLEY D CHANTREUIL F BERG S

Citation: D. Lepelley et al., THE LIKELIHOOD OF MONOTONICITY PARADOXES IN RUN-OFF ELECTIONS, Mathematical social sciences, 31(3), 1996, pp. 133-146

Authors: LEPELLEY D MBIH B

Citation: D. Lepelley et B. Mbih, THE VULNERABILITY OF 4 SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS TO COALITIONAL MANIPULATION OF PREFERENCES, Social choice and welfare, 11(3), 1994, pp. 253-265