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Results:
1-8
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Results: 8
Authors:
COLE HL
MAILATH GJ
POSTLEWAITE A
Citation: Hl. Cole et al., CLASS SYSTEMS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL NORMS, Journal of public economics, 70(1), 1998, pp. 5-35
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
Citation: Gj. Mailath, DO PEOPLE PLAY NASH EQUILIBRIUM - LESSONS FROM EVOLUTIONARY GAME-THEORY, Journal of economic literature, 36(3), 1998, pp. 1347-1374
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
SAMUELSON L
SHAKED A
Citation: Gj. Mailath et al., CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA AND LOCAL INTERACTIONS, Economic theory, 9(3), 1997, pp. 551-556
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
SAMUELSON L
SWINKELS JM
Citation: Gj. Mailath et al., HOW PROPER IS SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM (VOL 18, PG 193, 1997), Games and economic behavior, 19(2), 1997, pp. 249-249
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
SAMUELSON L
SWINKELS JM
Citation: Gj. Mailath et al., HOW PROPER IS SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM, Games and economic behavior, 18(2), 1997, pp. 193-218
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
SAMUELSON L
SWINKELS JM
Citation: Gj. Mailath et al., NORMAL-FORM STRUCTURES IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES, Journal of economic theory, 64(2), 1994, pp. 325-371
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
Citation: Gj. Mailath, PERPETUAL RANDOMNESS IN EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS, Economics letters, 42(2-3), 1993, pp. 291-299
Authors:
MAILATH GJ
OKUNOFUJIWARA M
POSTLEWAITE A
Citation: Gj. Mailath et al., BELIEF-BASED REFINEMENTS IN SIGNALING GAMES, Journal of economic theory, 60(2), 1993, pp. 241-276
Risultati:
1-8
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