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Results: 1-16 |
Results: 16
THE LEAST CORE, KERNEL AND BARGAINING SETS OF LARGE GAMES
Authors: EINY E MONDERER D MORENO D
Citation: E. Einy et al., THE LEAST CORE, KERNEL AND BARGAINING SETS OF LARGE GAMES, Economic theory, 11(3), 1998, pp. 585-601
A LEARNING APPROACH TO AUCTIONS
Authors: HONSNIR S MONDERER D SELA A
Citation: S. Honsnir et al., A LEARNING APPROACH TO AUCTIONS, Journal of economic theory (Print), 82(1), 1998, pp. 65-88
DYNAMIC NON-BAYESIAN DECISION-MAKING
Authors: MONDERER D TENNENHOLTZ M
Citation: D. Monderer et M. Tennenholtz, DYNAMIC NON-BAYESIAN DECISION-MAKING, The journal of artificial intelligence research, 7, 1997, pp. 231-248
POTENTIALS AND WEIGHTED VALUES OF NONATOMIC GAMES
Authors: HART S MONDERER D
Citation: S. Hart et D. Monderer, POTENTIALS AND WEIGHTED VALUES OF NONATOMIC GAMES, Mathematics of operations research, 22(3), 1997, pp. 619-630
CORE EQUIVALENCE THEOREMS FOR INFINITE CONVEX GAMES
Authors: EINY E HOLZMAN R MONDERER D SHITOVITZ B
Citation: E. Einy et al., CORE EQUIVALENCE THEOREMS FOR INFINITE CONVEX GAMES, Journal of economic theory, 76(1), 1997, pp. 1-12
BELIEF AFFIRMING IN LEARNING-PROCESSES
Authors: MONDERER D SAMET D SELA A
Citation: D. Monderer et al., BELIEF AFFIRMING IN LEARNING-PROCESSES, Journal of economic theory, 73(2), 1997, pp. 438-452
POTENTIAL GAMES
Authors: MONDERER D SHAPLEY LS
Citation: D. Monderer et Ls. Shapley, POTENTIAL GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 14(1), 1996, pp. 124-143
A 2X2 GAME WITHOUT THE FICTITIOUS PLAY PROPERTY
Authors: MONDERER D SELA A
Citation: D. Monderer et A. Sela, A 2X2 GAME WITHOUT THE FICTITIOUS PLAY PROPERTY, Games and economic behavior, 14(1), 1996, pp. 144-148
PROXIMITY OF INFORMATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Authors: MONDERER D SAMET D
Citation: D. Monderer et D. Samet, PROXIMITY OF INFORMATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, Mathematics of operations research, 21(3), 1996, pp. 707-725
CORE AND STABLE SETS OF LARGE GAMES ARISING IN ECONOMICS
Authors: EINY E HOLZMAN R MONDERER D SHITOVITZ B
Citation: E. Einy et al., CORE AND STABLE SETS OF LARGE GAMES ARISING IN ECONOMICS, Journal of economic theory, 68(1), 1996, pp. 200-211
FICTITIOUS PLAY PROPERTY FOR GAMES WITH IDENTICAL INTERESTS
Authors: MONDERER D SHAPLEY LS
Citation: D. Monderer et Ls. Shapley, FICTITIOUS PLAY PROPERTY FOR GAMES WITH IDENTICAL INTERESTS, Journal of economic theory, 68(1), 1996, pp. 258-265
MULTISTAGE SITUATIONS
Authors: GREENBERG J MONDERER D SHITOVITZ B
Citation: J. Greenberg et al., MULTISTAGE SITUATIONS, Econometrica, 64(6), 1996, pp. 1415-1437
STOCHASTIC COMMON LEARNING
Authors: MONDERER D SAMET D
Citation: D. Monderer et D. Samet, STOCHASTIC COMMON LEARNING, Games and economic behavior, 9(2), 1995, pp. 161-171
LOW DISCOUNTING AND THE UPPER LONG-RUN AVERAGE VALUE IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING
Authors: LEHRER E MONDERER D
Citation: E. Lehrer et D. Monderer, LOW DISCOUNTING AND THE UPPER LONG-RUN AVERAGE VALUE IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING, Games and economic behavior, 6(2), 1994, pp. 262-282
DISCOUNTING VERSUS AVERAGING IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING
Authors: LEHRER E MONDERER D
Citation: E. Lehrer et D. Monderer, DISCOUNTING VERSUS AVERAGING IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING, Games and economic behavior, 6(1), 1994, pp. 97-113
ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING
Authors: MONDERER D SORIN S
Citation: D. Monderer et S. Sorin, ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING, International journal of game theory, 22(1), 1993, pp. 1-11
Risultati: 1-16 |