Citation: A. Farmer et P. Pecorino, A REPUTATION FOR BEING A NUISANCE - FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND FEE SHIFTING IN A REPEATED PLAY GAME, International review of law and economics, 18(2), 1998, pp. 147-157
Citation: A. Farmer et P. Pecorino, BARGAINING WITH INFORMATIVE OFFERS - AN ANALYSIS OF FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION, The Journal of legal studies, 27(2), 1998, pp. 415-432
Citation: P. Pecorino, IS THERE A FREE-RIDER PROBLEM IN LOBBYING - ENDOGENOUS TARIFFS, TRIGGER STRATEGIES, AND THE NUMBER OF FIRMS, The American economic review, 88(3), 1998, pp. 652-660
Citation: P. Pecorino, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION - DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS - DOWNS,GW, ROCKE,DM, Public choice, 89(3-4), 1996, pp. 431-434
Citation: P. Pecorino, TAX RATES AND TAX REVENUES IN A MODEL OF GROWTH THROUGH HUMAN-CAPITALACCUMULATION, Journal of monetary economics, 36(3), 1995, pp. 527-539
Citation: Af. Curry et P. Pecorino, THE USE OF FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION AS A SCREENING DEVICE, The Journal of conflict resolution, 37(4), 1993, pp. 655-669