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Results: 1-14 |
Results: 14
EVOLVING ASPIRATIONS AND COOPERATION
Authors: KARANDIKAR R MOOKHERJEE D RAY D VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: R. Karandikar et al., EVOLVING ASPIRATIONS AND COOPERATION, Journal of economic theory (Print), 80(2), 1998, pp. 292-331
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION - SAMUELSON,L
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION - SAMUELSON,L, Journal of economic literature, 36(3), 1998, pp. 1504-1505
MULTILEVEL EVOLUTION IN POPULATION GAMES
Authors: CANALS J VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: J. Canals et F. Vegaredondo, MULTILEVEL EVOLUTION IN POPULATION GAMES, International journal of game theory, 27(1), 1998, pp. 21-35
THE EVOLUTION OF WALRASIAN BEHAVIOR
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, THE EVOLUTION OF WALRASIAN BEHAVIOR, Econometrica, 65(2), 1997, pp. 375-384
POLLINATION AND REWARD - A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, POLLINATION AND REWARD - A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH, Games and economic behavior, 12(1), 1996, pp. 127-142
LONG-RUN COOPERATION IN THE ONE-SHOT PRISONERS-DILEMMA - A HIERARCHICAL EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, LONG-RUN COOPERATION IN THE ONE-SHOT PRISONERS-DILEMMA - A HIERARCHICAL EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH, Biosystems, 37(1-2), 1996, pp. 39-47
TECHNOLOGICAL-CHANGE AND MARKET-STRUCTURE - AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, TECHNOLOGICAL-CHANGE AND MARKET-STRUCTURE - AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH, International journal of industrial organization, 14(2), 1996, pp. 203-226
EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH RANDOM MATCHING
Authors: ROBSON AJ VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: Aj. Robson et F. Vegaredondo, EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH RANDOM MATCHING, Journal of economic theory, 70(1), 1996, pp. 65-92
THE DYNAMICS AND REVEALED PREFERENCE OF STATUS-QUO OPTIMALITY
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, THE DYNAMICS AND REVEALED PREFERENCE OF STATUS-QUO OPTIMALITY, Economic theory, 6(2), 1995, pp. 263-282
EXPECTATIONS, DRIFT, AND VOLATILITY IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, EXPECTATIONS, DRIFT, AND VOLATILITY IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 11(2), 1995, pp. 391-412
PUBLIC SUBSCRIPTION AND PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, PUBLIC SUBSCRIPTION AND PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS, Social choice and welfare, 12(2), 1995, pp. 193-212
BAYESIAN BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL AGENTS PLAY THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, BAYESIAN BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL AGENTS PLAY THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA, Theory and decision, 36(2), 1994, pp. 187-206
COMPETITION AND CULTURE IN AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION - A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F
Citation: F. Vegaredondo, COMPETITION AND CULTURE IN AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION - A SIMPLE EXAMPLE, Games and economic behavior, 5(4), 1993, pp. 618-631
A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF PREDATOR-PREY SIGNALING
Authors: VEGAREDONDO F HASSON O
Citation: F. Vegaredondo et O. Hasson, A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF PREDATOR-PREY SIGNALING, Journal of theoretical biology, 162(3), 1993, pp. 309-319
Risultati: 1-14 |