AAAAAA

   
Results: 1-15 |
Results: 15
THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION - RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND TRANSITION
Authors: BATES RH DEFIGUEIREDO RJP WEINGAST BR
Citation: Rh. Bates et al., THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION - RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND TRANSITION, Politics & society, 26(4), 1998, pp. 603-642
THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION - RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND TRANSITION
Authors: BATES RH DEFIGUEIREDO RJ WEINGAST BR
Citation: Rh. Bates et al., THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION - RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND TRANSITION, Politics & society, 26(2), 1998, pp. 221-256
FEDERALISM AS A COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING MARKET INCENTIVES
Authors: QIAN YY WEINGAST BR
Citation: Yy. Qian et Br. Weingast, FEDERALISM AS A COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING MARKET INCENTIVES, The Journal of economic perspectives, 11(4), 1997, pp. 83-92
THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN TRADE-POLICY
Authors: BAILEY MA GOLDSTEIN J WEINGAST BR
Citation: Ma. Bailey et al., THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN TRADE-POLICY, World politics, 49(3), 1997, pp. 309
A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF FEDERALISM - INDIA
Authors: PARIKH S WEINGAST BR
Citation: S. Parikh et Br. Weingast, A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF FEDERALISM - INDIA, Virginia law review, 83(7), 1997, pp. 1593-1615
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Authors: WEINGAST BR
Citation: Br. Weingast, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, The American political science review, 91(2), 1997, pp. 245-263
THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE - WHY POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT - WITTMAN,D
Authors: WEINGAST BR
Citation: Br. Weingast, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE - WHY POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT - WITTMAN,D, The American political science review, 90(3), 1996, pp. 663-664
THE ECONOMIC-ROLE OF POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS - MARKET-PRESERVING FEDERALISM AND ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT
Authors: WEINGAST BR
Citation: Br. Weingast, THE ECONOMIC-ROLE OF POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS - MARKET-PRESERVING FEDERALISM AND ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 11(1), 1995, pp. 1-31
FEDERALISM, CHINESE STYLE - THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR ECONOMIC SUCCESS IN CHINA
Authors: MONTINOLA G QIAN YY WEINGAST BR
Citation: G. Montinola et al., FEDERALISM, CHINESE STYLE - THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR ECONOMIC SUCCESS IN CHINA, World politics, 48(1), 1995, pp. 50
A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF IDEAS - SHARED BELIEF SYSTEMS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL-COOPERATION
Authors: WEINGAST BR
Citation: Br. Weingast, A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF IDEAS - SHARED BELIEF SYSTEMS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL-COOPERATION, Politics & society, 23(4), 1995, pp. 449-464
REFLECTIONS ON DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND UNIVERSALISM
Authors: WEINGAST BR
Citation: Br. Weingast, REFLECTIONS ON DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND UNIVERSALISM, Political research quarterly, 47(2), 1994, pp. 319-327
FORMAL MODELS OF LEGISLATURES - INTRODUCTION
Authors: SHEPSLE KA WEINGAST BR
Citation: Ka. Shepsle et Br. Weingast, FORMAL MODELS OF LEGISLATURES - INTRODUCTION, Legislative studies quarterly, 19(2), 1994, pp. 145-147
POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Authors: SHEPSLE KA WEINGAST BR
Citation: Ka. Shepsle et Br. Weingast, POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS, Legislative studies quarterly, 19(2), 1994, pp. 149-179
NORTH,DOUGLASS,C. CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC-HISTORY
Authors: MYHRMAN J WEINGAST BR
Citation: J. Myhrman et Br. Weingast, NORTH,DOUGLASS,C. CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC-HISTORY, The Scandinavian journal of economics, 96(2), 1994, pp. 185-193
COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT - THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD
Authors: GREIF A MILGROM P WEINGAST BR
Citation: A. Greif et al., COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT - THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD, Journal of political economy, 102(4), 1994, pp. 745-776
Risultati: 1-15 |