string(236) "select * FROM articoli_opac WHERE fonte <> 'ISI' AND fonte='ICR' AND fasc_anno_pubbl='1992' AND fasc_issn='08998256' order by level desc, fasc_key desc, NULLIF(regexp_replace(pagina_ini, E'\\D', '', 'g'), '')::int asc offset 0 limit 25" ACNP - Italian Periodicals Catalogue
Results: 1-25 | 26-35    

Articles table of contents

Results : 1-25/35
Credible Assignments in Coordination Games..
Authors: JOHN B. VAN HUYCK ANN B. GILLETTE RAYMOND C. BATTALIO.
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: JOHN B. VAN HUYCK et al., Credible Assignments in Coordination Games.., Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 1
It Takes Two to Tango: Equilibria in a Model of Sales
Authors: DAN KOVENOCK CASPER G. DE VRIES
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: DAN KOVENOCK et CASPER G. DE VRIES, It Takes Two to Tango: Equilibria in a Model of Sales, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 493
Conventions, Social Prejudices and Discrimination: A Festival Game with Merry makers
Authors: MAMORU KANEKO TOSHIYUKI KIMURA
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: MAMORU KANEKO et TOSHIYUKI KIMURA, Conventions, Social Prejudices and Discrimination: A Festival Game with Merry makers, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 511
The Complexity of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games in Extensive Form
Authors: DAPHNE KOLLER NIMROD MEGIDDO
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: DAPHNE KOLLER et NIMROD MEGIDDO, The Complexity of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games in Extensive Form, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 528
The Small Worlds Axiom for Stable Equilibria
Authors: JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS, The Small Worlds Axiom for Stable Equilibria, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 553
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria and the Core in Three-Player Games
Authors: BENNY MOLDOVANU
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: BENNY MOLDOVANU, Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria and the Core in Three-Player Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 565
The Multilinear Exten sion and the Coalition Structure Value
Authors: GUILLERMO OWEN EYAL WINTER
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: GUILLERMO OWEN et EYAL WINTER, The Multilinear Exten sion and the Coalition Structure Value, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 582
The Least Core, Nucleolus, and Kernel of Homogeneous Weighted Majority Games
Authors: BEZALEL PELEG JOACHIM ROSENMÜLLER
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: BEZALEL PELEG et JOACHIM ROSENMÜLLER, The Least Core, Nucleolus, and Kernel of Homogeneous Weighted Majority Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 588
Optimal Pricing against a Simple Learning Rule
Authors: ERNST-LUDWIG VON THADDEN.
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: ERNST-LUDWIG VON THADDEN., Optimal Pricing against a Simple Learning Rule, Games and economic behavior, 4(04), 1992, pp. 627
Simultaneous Signaling through Investment in an R&D Game with PrivateInformation
Authors: REIKO AOKI DAVID REITMAN
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: REIKO AOKI et DAVID REITMAN, Simultaneous Signaling through Investment in an R&D Game with PrivateInformation, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 327
A Battle-of-the Sexes Game with Incomplete Information
Authors: JEFFREY S. BANKS RANDALL L. CALVERT
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: JEFFREY S. BANKS et RANDALL L. CALVERT, A Battle-of-the Sexes Game with Incomplete Information, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 347
Welfare Bounds in the Cooperative Production Problem
Authors: HERVÉ MOULIN
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: HERVÉ MOULIN, Welfare Bounds in the Cooperative Production Problem, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 373
Coalition Formation under Limited Communication
Authors: EDWARD C. ROSENTHAL
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: EDWARD C. ROSENTHAL, Coalition Formation under Limited Communication, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 402
Cheap Talk Games May Have Unique, In- formative Equilibrium Outcomes
Authors: DANIEL J. SEIDMANN
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: DANIEL J. SEIDMANN, Cheap Talk Games May Have Unique, In- formative Equilibrium Outcomes, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 422
Folk Theorems in Overlapping Generations Games
Authors: LONES SMITH
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: LONES SMITH, Folk Theorems in Overlapping Generations Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 426
On Self-Enforcement in Extensive-Form Games
Authors: JÖRGEN W. WEIBULL
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: JÖRGEN W. WEIBULL, On Self-Enforcement in Extensive-Form Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 450
Continuous Implementation in Economies with Incomplete Information
Authors: DAVID WETTSTEIN
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: DAVID WETTSTEIN, Continuous Implementation in Economies with Incomplete Information, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 463
On Nash Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
Authors: TAKEHIKO YAMATO
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: TAKEHIKO YAMATO, On Nash Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences, Games and economic behavior, 4(03), 1992, pp. 484
A Unique Solution to n-Person Sequential Bar- gaining
Authors: GEIR B. ASHEIM
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: GEIR B. ASHEIM, A Unique Solution to n-Person Sequential Bar- gaining, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 169
Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures
Authors: ADAM BRANDENBURGER EDDIE DEKEL JOHN GEANAKOPLOS.
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: ADAM BRANDENBURGER et al., Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 182
The Exponential Convergence of Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games
Authors: J. S. JORDAN
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: J. S. JORDAN, The Exponential Convergence of Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 202
Equilibrium Refinement in Psychological Games
Authors: VAN KOLPIN
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: VAN KOLPIN, Equilibrium Refinement in Psychological Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 218
Short-Run Stable Matchings between Bees and Flowers
Authors: B. PELEG A. SHMIDA
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: B. PELEG et A. SHMIDA, Short-Run Stable Matchings between Bees and Flowers, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 232
Self-Optimality and Efficiency in Utility Distortion Games
Authors: HANS PETERS
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: HANS PETERS, Self-Optimality and Efficiency in Utility Distortion Games, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 252
Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of theMinimax Hypothesis
Authors: AMNON RAPOPORT RICHARD B. BOEBEL
Journal: Games and economic behavior
Citation: AMNON RAPOPORT et RICHARD B. BOEBEL, Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of theMinimax Hypothesis, Games and economic behavior, 4(02), 1992, pp. 261
Results: 1-25 | 26-35