string(209) "select * FROM articoli_opac WHERE fonte <> 'ISI' AND fonte='ICR' AND fasc_issn='01475967' order by level desc, fasc_key desc, NULLIF(regexp_replace(pagina_ini, E'\\D', '', 'g'), '')::int asc offset 0 limit 25"
Citation: YEHUDA DON et al., Theoretical and Applied Aspects of Labor-Managed Firms: Editors' Introduction, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 567
Citation: NAVA KAHANA et AVI WEISS, Absenteeism: A Comparison of Incen tives in Alternative Organizations, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 573
Citation: LOUIS PUTTERMAN et GILBERT L. SKILLMAN, TheRole of Exit Costs in the Theory of Cooperative Teams, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 596
Citation: JOEL M. GUTTMAN, The Credibility Game: Reputation and Rational Cooperation in a Changing Population, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 619
Citation: HUGH M. NEARY, Some General Equilibrium Aspects of a Labor Managed Economy with Monopoly Elements, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 633
Citation: MICHAEL KEREN et DAVID LEVHARI, Some CapitalMarketFailures in the Socialist Labor-Managed Economy, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 655
Citation: EHUD SATT et HAIM GINZBURG, On the Dynamic Effects of Using Hired Labor in the Kibbutz-Theory andCase Studies., Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 688
Citation: RAYMOND RUSSELL et ROBERT HANNEMAN, Cooperatives and the Business Cycle: The Israeli Case, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 701
Citation: JOHN P. BONIN, Privatization and Efficient Contracts: The Workers' Stake in the Transition, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 716
Citation: WOJCIECH BIENKOWSKI, The Bermuda Triangle: Why Self-Governed Firms Work for Their Own Destruction, Journal of comparative economics, 16(04), 1992, pp. 750
Citation: EVAN KRAFT et MILAN VODOPIVEC, How Soft Is the Budget Con- straint for Yugoslav Firms?, Journal of comparative economics, 16(03), 1992, pp. 432
Citation: HUIZHONG ZHOU, An Explanation of Coexistence of Taut Planning and Hidden Reserves inCentrally Planned Economies..., Journal of comparative economics, 16(03), 1992, pp. 456
Citation: MENG-HUA YE et al., Optimal Internal Investment in a Labor- Managed Firm with Heterogeneous Membership: An Overlapping Generations Approach, Journal of comparative economics, 16(03), 1992, pp. 479
Citation: RICHARD C. HARMSTONE, Error in Interpretation of Soviet Capi tal Retirement Statistics, Journal of comparative economics, 16(03), 1992, pp. 515
Citation: FLAVIO DELBONO et GIANPAOLO ROSSINI, Competition Policy vs Horizontal Merger with Public, Entrepreneurial,and Labor-Man- aged Firms, Journal of comparative economics, 16(02), 1992, pp. 226
Citation: HELMUTH CREMER et JACQUES CRÉMER, Duopoly with Employee- Controlled and Profit-Maximizing Firms: Bertrand vs Cournot Competition, Journal of comparative economics, 16(02), 1992, pp. 241
Citation: OTTORINO CHILLEMI et BENEDETTO GUI, On The Performance of Worker-Managed Firms: Does Participation Only Exert Technical Effects?, Journal of comparative economics, 16(02), 1992, pp. 294