FIRM-LEVEL POLITICAL-BEHAVIOR IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE

The put-pose of this study was to investigate the political behaviors which firms use to deal with the political imperatives associated with international markets. The overarching hypothesis was that as politic al imperatives baring foreign market access increase so too will firm- level political behaviors designed to reduce these imperatives. Using a mail questionnaire data collection format, 171 completed survey inst ruments were obtained from executive-level decision markers at major U .S. corporations. The results show that: (1) firms engage in political activities designed to reduce the effects of political imperatives in foreign markets, and (2) the emphasis placed on these activities diff ers significantly depending upon the political imperative in question. Firms facing high levels of foreign transfer restrictions emphasize f oreign lobbying, political industry alliances, political inducements, and political action committees. Firms facing high levels of domestic transfer restrictions do not significantly emphasize political inducem ents, but add domestic lobbying, public relations, and friendships wit h U.S. government officials to the activities associated with foreign transfer restrictions. On the other hand, firms facing high levels of ownership/control restrictions emphasize foreign lobbying and politica l industry alliances. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science Inc.