Persons have a curious dual nature. On the one hand, they are subjects
, whose actions must be explained in terms of beliefs, desires, plans,
and goals. At the same time, however, they also are physical objects,
whose actions must be explicable in terms of physical laws. So far no
satisfying account of this duality has been offered. Both Cartesian d
ualism and the modern materialist alternatives (reductionist and antir
eductionist) have failed to capture the full range of our experience o
f persons. I argue that an exciting new approach to this difficulty ca
n be found by considering developments in clinical psychology. The cli
nical debate between those endorsing biological models of mental illne
ss and those endorsing psychodynamic models mirrors broader debates in
the philosophy of mind. The possible resolution of this debate throug
h the development of integrated psychobiological models suggests a pro
mising way to reconcile the dual nature of persons in a far more appea
ling way than any yet proposed.