The frequency with which presidents issue executive orders is an impor
tant area of inquiry for students of executive politics, because this
instrument can shape policy in a quick direct manner that is outside t
he purview of the legislative arena. We construct a probabilistic-base
d empirical model that is used to explain variation in the number of p
residential executive orders issued during the 1953-1994 annual period
. Using event count regression techniques, these results indicate that
the use of executive orders by presidents is significantly related to
the legislative success they enjoy, the partisan composition of Congr
ess, macroeconomic conditions, and the rate of growth in federal execu
tive branch employment. The main implication of the study is that a pr
esident's willingness to issue executive orders is significantly relat
ed to a combination of legislative, public prestige, and managerial/in
stitutional considerations. Thus, presidential use of executive orders
is conditioned on different types of causal factors, and not solely a
ttributable to the ''institutionalized presidency'' or legislative rel
ations with Congress, as suggested in previous research on the topic.