STRATEGY-PROOF DIVISION OF A PRIVATE GOOD WHEN PREFERENCES ARE SINGLE-DIPPED

Authors
KLAUS B PETERS H STORCKEN T
Citation
B. Klaus et al., STRATEGY-PROOF DIVISION OF A PRIVATE GOOD WHEN PREFERENCES ARE SINGLE-DIPPED, Economics letters, 55(3), 1997, pp. 339-346
Citations number
12
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Economics letters → ACNP
ISSN journal
01651765
Volume
55
Issue
3
Year of publication
1997
Pages
339 - 346
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(1997)55:3<339:SDOAPG>2.0.ZU;2-8
Abstract
Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof distributions of a perfectly divisib le good among agents with single-dipped preferences are studied. In or der to satisfy these two properties and, in addition, either a so-call ed replacement property or a property of consistency, the whole amount should be assigned to one of the agents. Characterizations of the two classes of division rules satisfying the above conditions are provide d. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.