TAKINGS, COMPENSATION, AND EQUAL TREATMENT FOR OWNERS OF DEVELOPED AND UNDEVELOPED PROPERTY

This article constructs an economic model of government takings in whi ch some property owners develop their land earlier than others. Becaus e it is efficient for the government to ''take'' undeveloped land befo re developed land, uncompensated takings will give landowners an incen tive to develop their property early in order to reduce the risk of go vernment appropriation. This overdevelopment incentive can be countere d, and efficiency thereby restored, if landowners are appropriately co mpensated when their property is taken, or if ''equal treatment'' is a fforded to owners of developed and undeveloped land. However, when the government responds to political pressure, a judicial compensation re quirement will often lead to less government land use regulation than is efficient. In contrast, a judicial equal treatment requirement can elicit efficient development and regulatory decisions.