MANAGING LARGE-SCALE TECHNOLOGY AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS - THE CASE OF THE CHANNEL TUNNEL

This paper provides an analysis of the difficulties affecting the deve lopment of the Channel Tunnel fixed link. The study draws upon relevan t concepts and concerns located in the disciplines of technology polic y, decision theory and project management. It evaluates the inflexibil ity (and non-incrementality) of the Channel Tunnel project in terms of capital intensity, unit size, dependence upon specialized infrastruct ure and lead time. Hitherto, research has provided support for the hyp othesis that technological projects characterized by the aforementione d factors will be unusually painful to develop, with adverse implicati ons for their performance in operation. Studies of this type have anal ysed, amongst other subjects, the development of nuclear power and fir st generation North Sea oil fields: cases which contravene the prescri ptions of incrementalism. Another aspect of the paper investigates the claim, also supported by previous research, that inflexible technolog y projects are promoted by centralized decision-making processes to th e exclusion of legitimate stakeholders. A more flexible, incremental a pproach, on the other hand, would emphasize the mutual adjustment and coordination of various stakeholders. The theme of the paper referred to here relates to the implications of centralized decision making ear ly in the Life of large-scale projects for subsequent inter-organizati onal conflict and the lack of the partnering or mutual approach that i s widely accepted as being a key factor in the effective management of such projects. The research benefits from interviews with key partici pants in the Channel Tunnel project as well as from a wealth of second ary data. Conclusions drawn refer to the whether the findings of the r esearch support or refute the incremental thesis and whether more flex ible alternative options were available to decision makers. (C) 1997 P ublished by Elsevier Science B.V.