The wave of bank and savings and loan failures in the 1980s and early
1990s, and the resulting losses to deposit insurance funds, served to
highlight the need for banks to hold sufficient capital to survive dif
ficult times. In addition, many argued that deposit insurance reduces
the market discipline that depositors might otherwise provide. Consequ
ently, recent bank regulatory initiatives increasingly have emphasized
the role of bank capital as a cushion to allow banks to absorb advers
e shocks without experiencing insolvency. While regulations are being
designed to reward banks that are deemed to be well. capitalized and r
estrict those that are not, no dear consensus has been reached in the
academic literature on just-how much capital is necessary. This articl
e examines whether institutions satisfying the ''well-capitalized'' cr
iteria before and during the recent banking crisis in New England had
sufficient capital to weather the storm. The authors find that many of
the institutions that either failed or required substantial superviso
ry intervention were well capitalized prior to the emergence of bankin
g problems in New England. Problems of the magnitude recently experien
ced in New England would require greater capital cushions than the min
imum ''well-capitalized'' prompt corrective action threshold, if wides
pread bank insolvencies were to be avoided.