The planned unification of twelve European states to an economic and p
olitical unit will increase the costs of political protest (voice) and
will lower the positive incentives if Europe's unification proceeds.
The argument is based on a model specifying the major incentives for v
oice that have been shown to be relevant due to previous research. The
high costs of organizing protests mainly result from the size of the
EC and the required 'critical mass' to make protests effective. The ma
jor factors that lead to small positive incentives are low political d
iscontent with the EC and its decisions and low perceived influence of
protests on changing EC institutions or decisions. In the final part
of the paper a normative question is discusssed: Should voice be subsi
dized? The argument that increasing the likelihood of voice may reduce
a democracy deficit of the EC is refuted. It is argued that referenda
are a more appropriate remedy.