THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA - A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

While providing the reader with an introduction to recent Canadian pol icy and an initial discussion and assessment of the post-Cold War cont ext within which security politics of the Korean Peninsula have evolve d, this article focuses on three main points. First, an argument is ma de that borrowing from Y. Dror's concept of the ''crazy state,'' one c an better understand the position and motivations of the North Korean leadership with regard to Northeast Asian security politics. Second, b orrowing from Axelrod, A. Stein, and others who have written about coo peration and uncertainty, one can better appreciate the range of optio ns available to both South and North Korea if what is wanted is really peace. Moreover, bringing this into the context of dealing with a ''c razy state'' should lead the other principal regional actors along wit h other interested parties to better calculate their roles and respons ibilities on the Korean peninsula. KEDO might be an interesting early example of this. Third, in light of the preceding analyses, peace and stability on the peninsula is likely to be enhanced by concentrating o n ensuring that both South and North Korea are fully and effectively i ntegrated into the international community as separate and sovereign s tates. The recent development of new sets of bilateral relations withi n Northeast Asia, along with the reaffirmation of the United States' c ommitment to its traditional Northeast Asian allies, all of which tend to strengthen South Korea's position, need to be complemented by esta blishing a regularized pattern of regional security dialogues and poli cy forums. These must be inclusive along the lines of a cooperative se curity agenda to ensure North Korean participation-even more important today given the DPRK's increased isolation from its former Cold War p artners. The North-South corollary of this is that while unification m ay be a longterm political goal, it should no longer be formally and a ggressively pursued by the two Korean governments. Unification should not, and probably cannot, be a prerequisite for peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. South Korea as well as others must balance a policy of strength and commitment to the peace of the regio n with being prepared to engage Pyongyang in a manner that will in tim e change the DPRK's calculation of interests and options.