New technologies are driving a new perception of ourselves and the wor
ld we live in that is relevant to strategic and security thinking in a
global economy. A ''creative universe'' has displaced science's old m
echanistic worldview with a consequent need in understanding the behav
ior of modern, advanced states to recognize that, exorcised of the Com
munist specter, world order is haunted by the specters of evolutionary
change: convergence, complexity, and culture. States need to be under
stood both as powers and cultures in a world that tends to evolve towa
rds greater organization, differentiation, and interdependence, and as
the key to survival and prosperity grows more knowledge and skill bas
ed. In such a world, the interaction of modern states with each other
must be seen more in terms of the imagery and non-linear dynamics of e
cology than of autonomous, atom-like entities colliding and power-bala
ncing in a zero-sum quest for hegemony. Self-help in a creative univer
se is more a question of mutual-regarding, positive-sum game, in which
survival is achieved by concensus building, and finding ways of coevo
lving with competitors, since cooperation is structurally driven by gr
owing complexity. Nor is a creative universe converging on Western way
s, but predisposed towards cultural heterogeneity. Non-kinship-based '
'reciprocal cooperation'' emerges spontaneously in the struggle for su
rvival amid growing complexity. In such a world, state autarky is an i
mpossible dream; hegemony, an ever more elusive, improbable goal; and
modern states find that their security concerns have more and more in
common. Few states are more affected by the challenges of evolutionary
change in our times than America and Japan. As the two largest, most
advanced economies, their highly competitive, leading-edge, wealth-cre
ating corporations increasingly feel compelled to collaborate in strat
egic alliances to ensure their survival. Yet their political and secur
ity practitioners, buttressed by different ideological orientations an
d cultural traditions, largely remain stuck in the old realist zero-su
m mindset that sees one country's gain as the other's loss, even thoug
h, in a ''creative universe,'' the return of nineteenth-century Europe
an-style multipolarity and hegemony is unlikely. Two more probable fut
ures are either economically oriented spheres of influence centered la
rgely on Europe, the Americas, and East Asia, or a more ''polycentric,
'' or ''polyarchic'' configuration of power relations reflecting the d
iffusion of power and the imperatives of cooperation as well as the po
tential for conflict. Growing complexity and the ''incompleteness'' of
even the most powerful states ensures that no state can choose its ow
n best strategy, or attain its best outcome, independent of the choice
s of other states. In short, the revitalization of the US-Japan allian
ce needs to acknowledge the implications of the forces of convergence,
complexity, and culture, and proceed hand in hand with a sustained, h
igh-level dialogue on Northeast Asian security between China, Japan, R
ussia, and America, and, where appropriate, the Koreas, and the Republ
ic of Mongolia. The need for high-level engagement between America, Ja
pan and China, in particular, could largely determine whether China an
d Japan can be fully integrated peacefully as powers and cultures in a
future world order.