THERE IS MORE TO EMOTION THAN GOAL ATTAINMENT

The current conflict theory of emotion states that emotions arise at j unctures of plans in which circumstances show the likely attainment or nonattainment of a goal and in which those circumstances include othe r plans and other goals. But emotions often arise from side goals rath er than from the goal being aimed at. This article raises the question of what a goal is and suggests that any goal statement should include goals about a person's identity, self-definition, and cognitive devel opment. This approach questions the sharp distinction usually drawn be tween goal and cognitive structure and puts forward a broader view of emotion as the awareness of important cognitive change that results fr om the validation or invalidation of one's cognitive system or a part of it. This view emphasizes the role of having a model of the self and shows how emotions can be defined as beliefs about changes in belief. This approach suggests that, just as pain monitors changes in physica l states, so emotions monitor changes in mental states, providing high -level information for the management of cognitions. Another function of emotion is to identify the type and magnitude of inconsistencies be tween two mental states in a timely manner; such identification avoids the need for logical proof or numerical calculation.