DISCRIMINATING ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF FALSE RECOGNITION - THE CASES OF WORD CONCRETENESS AND WORD-FREQUENCY

Citation
E. Hirshman et J. Arndt, DISCRIMINATING ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF FALSE RECOGNITION - THE CASES OF WORD CONCRETENESS AND WORD-FREQUENCY, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition, 23(6), 1997, pp. 1306-1323
Citations number
30
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology, Experimental",Psychology
ISSN journal
02787393
Volume
23
Issue
6
Year of publication
1997
Pages
1306 - 1323
Database
ISI
SICI code
0278-7393(1997)23:6<1306:DACOFR>2.0.ZU;2-L
Abstract
A classical finding in recognition memory is that participants falsely recognize new high-frequency words more than new low-frequency words. Similarly, participants falsely recognize new abstract words more tha n new concrete words. The authors contrast a memory-based explanation of these effects to a decision-based explanation. In the former explan ation, differences in false recognition arise because some sets of new items have properties that discriminate them from study-list items st ored in memory. In the latter explanation, differences in false recogn ition arise because some sets of old items are especially well remembe red. This strong memory influences decision processes, with resulting effects on false recognition of new items. The authors test these view s by examining the relationship between relative hit rates and relativ e false-alarm rates under a variety of encoding conditions. The result s of 7 experiments support the memory-based approach.