CAMPAIGN-FINANCE-REFORM AND THE 1994-CONGRESSIONAL-ELECTIONS

Based on partisan arguments regarding the likely effect of campaign fi nance reform on electoral competition, one might suspect that, had spe nding limits been in place prior to the 1994 midterm elections, Republ icans would not have been able to gain control of the House of Represe ntatives. To examine this proposition, we first create a regression mo del designed to explain the Democratic percentage of the vote as a fun ction of candidate spending, incumbency, nonincumbent candidate qualit y, and the underlying partisan leanings of the congressional districts . We then use this regression model to simulate the likely effects of campaign finance reform on the outcome of the 1994 midterm elections. Our results indicate that while spending limits would have limited the number of seats gained by the Republican parry, Republicans likely wo uld have gained control of the House of Representatives even if spendi ng limits had been in place prior to the 1994 elections. In addition, our results indicate that campaign finance reform that includes some f orm of public subsidy in addition to spending limits actually may have enhanced rather than diminished the Republican ''earthquake'' in 1994 .