WHY IS BANK DEBT SENIOR - A THEORY OF ASYMMETRY AND CLAIM PRIORITY BASED ON INFLUENCE COSTS

Authors
Citation
I. Welch, WHY IS BANK DEBT SENIOR - A THEORY OF ASYMMETRY AND CLAIM PRIORITY BASED ON INFLUENCE COSTS, The Review of financial studies, 10(4), 1997, pp. 1203-1236
Citations number
34
Categorie Soggetti
Business Finance
ISSN journal
08939454
Volume
10
Issue
4
Year of publication
1997
Pages
1203 - 1236
Database
ISI
SICI code
0893-9454(1997)10:4<1203:WIBDS->2.0.ZU;2-I
Abstract
This theory can explain why bank, debt is universally senior, consiste nt with the presence of conflict (lawyers) and absolute priority viola tions in financial distress: Better organized banks would more strongl y contest priority in financial distress if they were junior. Because ''deterrence'' can reduce creditors' total expenses in a priority cont est, the ex post stronger lobbyist/litigant should be senior ex ante. For equivalent reasons, the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and/or implicit contracts, and can even sugg est one rationale for the absolute priority rule (APR). This article f urther shows that Chapter II creditor reimbursement procedures can low er overall costs.