Le. Grinter, SOUTHEAST-ASIAN SECURITY INTO THE 21ST-CENTURY - EMERGING PATTERNS AND CHALLENGES, The Korean journal of defense analysis, 8(2), 1996, pp. 117
By the early 21st century, Southeast Asia's security situation will ex
hibit three principal trends: (a) ASEAN will have expanded its members
hip from seven to nine (or ten) members; (b) the region's shift from i
nternal defense to external security will be bolstered by high technol
ogy weapons purchases, including missile-armed frigates, small helicop
ter aircraft. carriers, submarines, and upgraded F-16s and F-18s; and
(c) a gradual enlargement of ASEAN responsibilities will occur toward
a functional security regime in the South China Sea. Each of these tre
nds is controversial and is subject to opposition or complication both
within and from outside the region. And these practices may retard th
ese governments' admission to or, if admitted, their full absorption i
nto, the association. Secondly, regional weapons purchases, while not
technically constituting ''arms races,'' cause anxieties among various
Southeast Asian governments. Finally, ASEAN has been slow to move bey
ond forums, workshops, and confidence-building measures to actual func
tionally integrated external security measures. United States policy t
owards Southeast Asia's trends is correct to emphasize democracy, mark
et economics, and external security, However, US policy finds itself a
t odds with a majority of current ASEAN governments (if not all the pe
ople within those societies) which are ecr looking the other way on hu
man rights violations, and are uncomfortable, so far, with external se
curity missions. Nevertheless, US policy has some leverage: Washington
can withhold investments and credits to the most egregious violators.
And, by virtue of the US military presence in Southeast Asia and Amer
ican security guarantees, regional governments want Washington to cont
inue underwriting Southeast Asia's external security while Chinese pol
itical-military expansion continues.