VOLUNTARY CUTBACKS AND PRETREATY BEHAVIOR - THE HELSINKI PROTOCOL ANDSULFUR EMISSIONS

This article formulates a noncooperative game model of sulfur emission reductions that accounts for the transboundary transport of emissions . Bared on this model, European demand for emission reductions is deri ved from 1980 to 1985. In the early 1980s, information on sulfur emiss ions and depositions became available and allowed nations to assess th eir desired levels of emission reductions. We estimate European demand for cutbacks prior to the Helsinki Protocol's mandated reductions by using spatially autoregressive techniques. This demand depends on the price of emission cutbacks, national income, self-inflicted damage, ba seline emission levels, and freedoms. Qualitative analysis lends suppo rt to the noncooperative depiction and our characterization of the Pro tocol as reflecting actions that many nations were already taking.