MIXED DUOPOLY, INEFFICIENCY, AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP

Authors
GEORGE K LAMANNA MMA
Citation
K. George et Mma. Lamanna, MIXED DUOPOLY, INEFFICIENCY, AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, Review of industrial organization, 11(6), 1996, pp. 853-860
Citations number
6
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,Management
Journal title
Review of industrial organization → ACNP
ISSN journal
0889938X
Volume
11
Issue
6
Year of publication
1996
Pages
853 - 860
Database
ISI
SICI code
0889-938X(1996)11:6<853:MDIAPO>2.0.ZU;2-T
Abstract
If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private fir m, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public fi rm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''smal l''.