THE SEARCH FOR THE OPTIMUM INDIVIDUAL MONETARY INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEM -A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF FLAT PAY AND LINEAR AND NONLINEAR INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEMS ON WORKER PRODUCTIVITY
Da. Smoot et Pk. Duncan, THE SEARCH FOR THE OPTIMUM INDIVIDUAL MONETARY INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEM -A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF FLAT PAY AND LINEAR AND NONLINEAR INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEMS ON WORKER PRODUCTIVITY, Journal of organizational behavior management, 17(2), 1997, pp. 5-75
This study continued the search for the optimum individual monetary in
centive pay system by investigating the effects of a flat pay system a
nd three individual incentive pay systems (linear, positively accelera
ting and negatively accelerating) on worker productivity. Four experim
ents were conducted using a within-subject, multiple-baseline design.
Experiment I was a systematic replication of the earlier work of Oah a
nd Dickinson (1992) and Experiments 2, 3 and 4 were systematic replica
tions of each other with different questions being asked about the eff
icacy of the three incentive pay systems. In each experiment, the subj
ects worked in groups, ranging in size from four to six members, and w
ere exposed to the flat pay system and to one of the incentive pay sys
tems while engaged in a simple production task. Subjects participated
in twenty (Experiment 1 and 2) to twenty-five (Experiment 3 and 4) fif
teen-minute sessions. The production task consisted of constructing ''
widgets'' from pop beads. The primary dependent variables were the num
ber of correctly made widgets per work session and the cost-per-widget
. The four experiments produced mixed results with respect to widget p
roductivity and cost-per-widget; however, there were two consistent fi
ndings. A systematic relationship between pay and productivity emerged
in that, with all four experiments, the incentive pay systems generat
ed higher levels of productivity than did the flat pay system. Also, t
he three incentive pay systems differentially affected performance lev
els and cost-per-widget. Across the four experiments, the negatively a
ccelerating pay system emerged as the most reasonable option for pay s
ystem designers. This finding suggests that it is not the size of the
incentive which controls performance, but rather the fact that there w
as a pay-for-performance contingency in place.