THE IMPORT OF SKINNERS 3-TERM CONTINGENCY

Skinner moved his behavior analysis into a selection-by-consequences t radition that largely if not completely replaced the mechanistic appar atus in the mechanistic tradition of early behaviorism. However, remna nts of that apparatus have not been abandoned by some behavior analyst s who have appealed to Skinner for support. For example, some behavior analysts have made claims in support of Newtonian mechanism, physical determinism, predominant similarities between the views of the mechan ist Jacques Loeb and those of Skinner, and interpreting Skinner's oper ant as a two-term contingency. These claims have been made with appeal s to Skinner for their validity. Such claims support a realignment of Skinner's behavior analysis with the mechanistic tradition that served as a framework for many early behaviorists. But Skinner's account of his three-term contingency does not support such claims. The view pres ented here argues that Skinner's operant is integrated as a three-term unit within a selectionist tradition that has explanatory origins in probabilistic relations and random variation. This tradition is fundam entally opposed to a mechanistic tradition that has explanatory origin s in determinism and its manifestations in paired connections of if-th en necessity.