THE INTEGRATIVE COMPLEXITY OF AMERICAN DECISION-MAKERS IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The focus of this study is the integrative complexity of information p rocessing of Kennedy administration officials before, during, and afte r the Cuban missile crisis (CMC). Three elements of the CMC decision-m aking environment have been commonly noted: a high level of stress, id eological disputes among the decision makers, and the need to present a policy outcome palatable to the American public. Overall, American l eaders maintained moderate levels of integrative complexity through ev en the most dangerous moments of the crisis but showed a pattern compa tible with the cognitive manager and disruptive stress models of compl exity change in response to environmental challenge. There was no sign ificant difference in the complexity of remarks of the so-called hawks and doves among the Kennedy team, calling into question either the ve racity of the alleged rift or the manifestations of value conflict in complexity data. Leadership statements made in camera were significant ly more complex than public presentations.