COERCIVE POWER AND CONCESSION MAKING IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATION

This experiment examined the effects of negotiators' and opponents' co ercive capability on level of demand and on communication of threats a nd promises. Applying conflict spiral and deterrence perspectives insp ired contrasting predictions, Subjects were given high, moderate, or l ow coercive power and learned that their opponents had low, moderate, or high coercive power. Subsequently subjects negotiated through compu ters with opponents (in reality, simulated by a computer), who sent co mpellent threats or promises designed to induce some desired behavior. Higher levels of the focal negotiator's coercive power increased comm unication of threats but did not influence level of demand. Higher lev els of the opponent's coercive power produced greater decline in level of demand but only when the opponent sent threats instead of promises . Power balance produced less communication of threats and greater dec line of demand than power preponderance. The conclusion discusses limi tations and contributions, as well as the applied value for mediation and dispute resolution.