This study ascertains the extent to which domestic politics and the st
ate of the national economy are relevant factors to U.S. presidents fa
ced with the decision to use force during international crises. The au
thor tests a diversionary theory of the use of force that treats the r
elationship between politics and the use of force as nonrecursive and
that considers both the incentives and the constraints faced by the pr
esident. To analyze the political economy of the use of force from 194
9 to 1984, the author uses a simultaneous equations model specified wi
th force and presidential approval as the endogenous variables. This d
esign taps the interdependence between politics, the economy, and the
decision to use force, and allows the author to assess the direct and
indirect effects of the economy on uses of force. The author finds an
indirect link between the economy, politics, and the use of force.