NUCLEAR TABOO AND WAR INITIATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

This article addresses the role of nuclear taboo or the tradition of n onuse of nuclear weapons in limited wars involving a nuclear- and a no nnuclear-weapon state and the importance of this prohibitionary norm t o deterrence theory. It explores nonnuclear states' strategic calculat ions before launching wars against nuclear-armed states. It discusses the historical, moral, normative, and rational bases of the taboo and explains why nuclear states have refrained from using their capability vis-a-vis nonnuclear challengers. Two cases of nonnuclear states init iating wars-the 1973 Egyptian offensive against Israel and the 1982 Ar gentine invasion of the British Falkland Islands-and the calculations of these states' decision makers on their adversaries' nuclear capabil ity are addressed. The article concludes by discussing the implication s of nuclear taboo for deterrence theory and regional conflicts, the c onditions under which it could be broken, and the likely consequences of its infraction.