WHEN ARE JURIDICALLY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES RESPONSIVE TO ELECTED OFFICIALS - A SIMULATION-BASED ON THE COSTA-RICAN CASE

There has been much study of the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis socie ty. This article, however, focuses on autonomy within the state-the ab ility of elected officials to control the bureaucracy so that it will implement their policy goals even when the relevant agency has juridic al autonomy, versus when such agencies can pursue their own policy goa ls. Juridically autonomous agencies are an important subset of the bur eaucracy in most Latin American democracies; thus this subject merits study because of its implications for bureaucratic accountability and the legitimacy of democratic government. Through simulation, using a m odel of Costa Rican bureaucratic politics, we learn that when elected officials desire a higher level of service production than the agency wants, they are unable to induce the agency to respond and can inadver tently cause it to produce less efficiently. However, when the agency wants to produce more service than elected officials desire, the execu tive can use the budget to constrain the agency and overall efficiency is enhanced.