BLAMING THE VICTIM - OPTIMAL INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST CRIME

Crime deterrence is ordinarily regarded as a function of the magnitude of the sanctions and the enforcement measures that the government emp loys. This article argues that victims of crime may also be in a posit ion to take enforcement measures that may deter crime and substitute o r complement the government's effort. However, it may be difficult to synchronize the government's and the victims' efforts to reach the opt imal combined enforcement, since victims' incentives to take precautio ns usually diverge from what is socially optimal. To correct the victi ms' incentives, criminal law can use an incentive mechanism which we l abel ''contributory fault'', a victim that fails to take the socially optimal level of precautions would lose some of the publicly provided protection. If the sanction on the offender would depend on his victim 's conduct, and would be reduced whenever the victim deviates from the socially optimal effort, the victim may be led to engage in optimal p recautions, to guarantee himself greater protection, This is accomplis hed without sacrificing deterrence. This article suggests that some cr iminal law doctrines can be illuminated by the contributory fault idea .