CONCEPTUAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Are the words in our natural language which we use to speak about natu ral and social phenomena actually laden with preexisting (and hence co rrigible) theoretical commitments, full-blown ''ontologies,'' or even metaphysics Or can we appeal to rules for their use in adjudicating th e sense (or otherwise) of any scientific or philosophical innovation? These questions arise most commonly in the context of claims about sci entific ''transformations,'' especially ''scientific revolutions.'' Co gnitive science, for example, announces such a ''revolution'' in its c onceptualizations of the true nature of the ''mind,'' ''thought,'' ''i ntelligence,'' ''understanding,'' and so on. In this paper I shall arg ue that Wittgenstein's reflections on ''grammar'' enable us to dissolv e many of the perplexities that confront us when we invoke Kuhnian ''i ncommensurability'' in distinguishing between genuine scientific revol utions and pseudo-revolutions. Indeed, the Kuhnian thesis itself is se en to depend on a range of contestable claims about ''words'' and ''me anings.''