A TELEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF MODERN COGNITIVISM

This paper summarizes a teleological critique of modern cognitivism in terms of four points that address the suitability of such mechanistic accounts to explain human cognition: (1) Final-cause formulations are not required to understand mechanical processing, whereas human reaso ning cannot be understood without them. (2) Computer theory is exclusi vely extraspective, but human reasoning demands an introspective theor etical account. (3) A mechanical process is limited to mediation, wher eas human beings employ a predication process in their reasoning. (4) Human beings employ oppositionality, enabling them to reason according to a soft disjunction, whereas machines follow a Boolean logic that l imits them to a hard disjunction in which only apposition is at play. Research reputed to be dealing with key criticisms of this paper is ex amined and found wanting. The author's research in support of predicat ional modeling is cited.