CONGRUENCE BETWEEN CITIZENS AND POLICY-MAKERS IN 2 VISIONS OF LIBERALDEMOCRACY

This paper explores two quite different visions of the democratic proc esses that can create congruence between citizen preferences and publi c policies. In the Majority Control vision, electoral competition and citizen choices result in the direct election of governments committed to policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter. In the Proportionate Influence vision, election outcomes result in legisl atures that reflect the preferences of all citizens; legislative barga ining results in policies linked to the position of the median voter. The authors give more explicit theoretical form to those visions and l ink them empirically to specific types of modern democracies. They the n attempt to test the success of each vision in bringing about congrue nce between citizen self-placements and the estimated positions of gov ernments and policymaker coalitions on the left-right scale in twelve nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the analysis revea ls weaknesses in each approach, it suggests a consistent advantage for the Proportionate Influence vision.