Do managers in government perceive higher levels of red tape in their
organizations than managers in industry? Most people would think so, b
ut organizational researchers have often found that government organiz
ations do not necessarily have higher levels of rule intensity than bu
siness firms. If there are higher levels in government, what explains
their existence? Hal Rainey, Sanjay Pandey, and Barry Bozeman report o
n a survey of public and private managers' perceptions of red tape tha
t supports some common assertions about red tape in government but tha
t contrasts sharply with other assertions. The public and private mana
gers differed little on general questions about rule enforcement Yet t
he public managers were much more likely than private managers to repo
rt that rules constrain the relation between managers performance and
their pay and promotion. The authors assess several explanations of wh
ether and why public managers may create red tape, including a goal am
biguity hypothesis, an insecurity hypothesis, and an expectancy hypoth
esis. The results show some support for the latter two hypotheses. The
results also support the goal ambiguity hypothesis, but among both th
e public and private managers. The authors ultimately conclude that ex
ternal rules and laws concerning such functions as personnel and procu
rement are the mast important sources of red tape in government. The a
uthors call for more systematic analysis of red tape, including the us
e of methods such as those reported here, in support of current reform
efforts aimed at reducing red tape.