ELECTIONS AS FILTERS - TERM LIMITS AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE US HOUSE

Assessment of proposals to limit legislative terms has been restricted , and thus muddled, by a dearth of empirical data. Absent hard evidenc e, an abundance of often contradictory speculation has emerged, furthe r clouding the term limits debate. This paper offers a simple mathemat ical model in an effort to construct a sound analytic framework for ex amination of the possible effects of terms limits on the composition o f the U.S. House The model treats elections as filters, or mechanisms with which voters strive to differentiate among candidates on the basi s of quality The analysis demonstrates that term limits will produce a substantial reduction in the quality of the U.S. House under baseline conditions. Terms limits also are associated with a decline in the qu ality of the House in a majority of alternative conditions, and the av erage magnitude of that decline is substantial.