CHILDRENS MEMORY AND METAPHORICAL INTERPRETATION

Assumptions of constructivism, information-processing, and fuzzy-trace theory were tested in two experiments on memory and comprehension of metaphors with 6- and 9-year-old children. In the first experiment, ve rbatim memory for metaphors was compared with misrecognition of the gi st of metaphorical meaning. In the second experiment, children judged metaphorical meaning, including alternative perceptual and psychologic al interpretations. We found that (a) children misrecognized the gist of metaphorical interpretations, especially after a delay, much like t hey do for literal gist (e.g., true inferences); (b) contrary to both constructivism and information-processing theory, misrecognizing metap horical gist was independent of memory for the metaphor itself; (c) tr ue psychological interpretations were misrecognized and judged accepta ble more often than any other type at all ages; and (d) contrary to th e idea that literal or perceptual interpretations are suppressed to ac hieve psychological interpretations, acceptances of alternative interp retations were positively dependent. Results were consistent with thos e obtained for literal language and for numerical information and are explained by fuzzy-trace theory.