HEROIN CONTROL POLICY UNDER THE THEORY OF RATIONAL ADDICTION

The theory of rational addiction suggests that demand for addictive go ods is more sensitive to changes in the full cost of consuming those g oods than has previously been believed. The theory thus suggests that an efficient method of reducing the consumption of an addictive good i s to significantly increase its retail price, in the case of illicit g oods by enforcing a so-called permanent law enforcement war which may involve the elimination of harm reduction strategies. This paper gives a rudimentary introduction to the theory of rational addiction and it s policy prescriptions in the case of heroin. Some criticisms are then presented which caution against the use of this approach for the purp oses of heroin drug policy formulation. These criticisms are founded o n two propositions. Firstly, that a permanent law enforcement war whic h seriously disrupts the lifestyles of addicts and their acquaintances is likely to promote future consumption and addiction and so, at leas t in part, be counterproductive. The second proposition suggests that heroin addicts and suppliers in particular are able to quickly and suc cessfully adapt to changes in a given law enforcement regime. Faced wi th such elusive targets, any permanent law enforcement war, to be succ essful, may need to be one whose level of intensity is constantly incr easing over time. The financial and social costs of such a policy resp onse may outweigh the benefits.