STRATEGY STABILITY AND SINCERITY IN APPROVAL VOTING

Authors
LUO YF YUE CY CHEN T
Citation
Yf. Luo et al., STRATEGY STABILITY AND SINCERITY IN APPROVAL VOTING, Social choice and welfare, 13(1), 1996, pp. 17-23
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods",Economics
Journal title
Social choice and welfare → ACNP
ISSN journal
01761714
Volume
13
Issue
1
Year of publication
1996
Pages
17 - 23
Database
ISI
SICI code
0176-1714(1996)13:1<17:SSASIA>2.0.ZU;2-B
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerit y in approval voting. It gives ''strong'' support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the unif ormly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greate r than 5.