ON THE NEUTRAL STABILITY OF MIXED STRATEGIES IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS

Authors
BHASKAR V
Citation
V. Bhaskar, ON THE NEUTRAL STABILITY OF MIXED STRATEGIES IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS, Mathematical social sciences, 30(3), 1995, pp. 273-284
Citations number
18
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods","Mathematical, Methods, Social Sciences
Journal title
Mathematical social sciences → ACNP
ISSN journal
01654896
Volume
30
Issue
3
Year of publication
1995
Pages
273 - 284
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-4896(1995)30:3<273:OTNSOM>2.0.ZU;2-Y
Abstract
Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionary stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy th e weaker criterion of neutral stability. This paper shows that such ex amples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We ap ply our result to the battle of the sexes between males and females ov er the raising of offspring.